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INTRODUCTION
Article I of the Constitution vests the Vice President with the power
to vote in the Senate in the event of a tie. Textually, this power is not
subject to any additional qualifications. However, there are reasons to
believe that the Framers intended this tie-breaking power to have certain
practical limits, specifically in the context of confirming Article III
judges. This essay argues that concerns about the separation of powers,
the differences between legislation and the confirmation of presidential
nominees, anti-majoritarianism, and the forsaken sixty-vote threshold for
Supreme Court nominees all militate toward a prudential limit that
restricts the Vice President from casting a tie-breaking vote to confirm a
Supreme Court Justice.
I.

HISTORY OF THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE AND THE ROLES OF THE
SENATE
A.

Vice Presidents Past

Given its relatively infrequent use since 1789, there has not been
much scholarship devoted to the use of the vice president’s tie-breaking
authority. With the exception of Vice Presidents John Adams (twentynine votes), John C. Calhoun (thirty-one votes), and George M. Dallas
(nineteen votes), the power has been used quite sparingly.1 From 1875
onward, vice presidents have rarely cast tie-breaking votes.2
Historically, the exercise of this authority was not controversial
because its use was confined to procedural and legislative matters—
matters on which everyone agreed the vice president had the power to
cast tie-breaking votes.3 Tensions did arise, however, when the tiebreaking authority was used in non-procedural and non-legislative
matters.4 But even in most of these instances, the authority and propriety
1

U.S. SENATE, OCCASIONS WHEN VICE PRESIDENTS HAVE VOTED TO BREAK TIE VOTES IN
SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/VPTies.pdf (last visited
Feb. 2, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/JP4E-JNDC.
2 Id.
3 Henry Barrett Learned, Casting Votes of the Vice-Presidents, 1789–1915, 20 AM. HIST. REV.
571 (1915).
4 Id. at 572. Vice Presidents Calhoun and Fillmore in 1829 and 1850, respectively, each
determined in a divided Senate the election of a chaplain. In 1877 Vice President Wheeler cast a
tie-breaking vote favoring the motion to consider a report of the Senate Committee on Privileges
and Elections, which touched on the matter of admittance to Senate membership. This 1877 vote
sparked an “intelligent, though inconclusive discussion,” on the vice president’s right to cast a vote
in such matters. Senator Allen G. Thurman of Ohio argued that there were certain issues, where
although the Senate is equally divided, the vice president should not be allowed to cast a vote,
whereas Senator George F. Edmunds of Vermont interpreted the Constitution’s grant of authority
to the vice president as absolute. Id.
THE
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of the vice president to cast tie-breaking votes was not questioned.
With respect to presidential nominees, from 1975 until recently,
sixty votes were needed for the Senate to end a filibuster and move to a
vote.5 As a result, such nominations never resulted in a tie which the vice
president could break. Prior to 1975 two-thirds of Senators were needed
to invoke cloture.6 Thus, until Vice President Mike Pence cast a tiebreaking vote to confirm Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos, no vice
president had cast a tie-breaking vote on a presidential nomination since
1862, when Vice President Hamlin voted to postpone cloture on the
nomination of a Major-General of Volunteers.7 However, even this was
not a substantive vote, and had “no measurable effect” on the ratification
of the appointment a month later.8 Prior to that, in 1832, Vice President
Calhoun cast a tie-breaking vote that defeated the nomination of Martin
Van Buren as Minister to Great Britain.9
Besides a tie-breaking vote from then-Vice President George H.W.
Bush on a motion to reconsider a nominee for a district court judgeship
(who was eventually confirmed by a vote of forty-eight to forty-six), no
tie-breaking vote has touched upon the nomination of an Article III
judge.10
The fact that the vice-presidential power to cast tie-breaking votes
has been used so sparingly—and virtually never on serious matters—is
consistent with the intent of some, albeit a minority, of the Framers of the
Constitution. On September 7, 1787, the Constitutional Convention
debated the role of the vice president.11 Three of the Framers, Mr.
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, Mr. Hugh Williamson of North
Carolina, and Colonel George Mason of Virginia voiced their opposition
to the proposed role of the vice president as ex-officio President of the
Senate for various reasons.12 Mr. Gerry saw this role for the vice
president as tantamount to “[putting] the President himself at the head of
the Legislature.”13 Mr. Williamson commented that the office of the vice
presidency was not even needed, but “for the sake of valuable mode of

5 CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, INVOKING CLOTURE IN THE SENATE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.
(Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/be873e40-a966-4feb-9d72-cf23a93cbe46.pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/3WL8-W4JL.
6 VALERIE HEITSHUSEN & RICHARD S. BETH, FILIBUSTERS AND CLOTURE IN THE SENATE,
CONG. RES. SERV. (2017), https://www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/3d51be23-64f8-448e-aa1410ef0f94b77e.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/9TBK-REBL.
7 Learned, supra note 3, at 572.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 RICHARD S. BETH, CLOTURE ATTEMPTS ON NOMINATIONS: DATA AND HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENTS , CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (June 26, 2013), https://www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/
83d4b792-d34b-4215-be6d-4a3c4e976d2b.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/GK3Q-F79U.
11 NOTES OF DEBATE IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON
596 (The Norton Library 1966).
12 Id.
13 Id.
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election.”14
Colonel Mason’s remarks were more nuanced. He said that
endowing the vice president with the powers that come from being an exofficio president of the Senate “[encroaches] on the rights of the Senate;
and . . . [mixes] too much the Legislative & Executive, which as well as
the Judiciary departments, ought to be kept as separate as possible.”15
Mason also objected to either house of Congress being given the power
to make appointments, but simultaneously was averse to vesting “so
dangerous a power in the President alone.”16 He suggested that a “privy
Council,” consisting of six members chosen by the Senate, provide the
advisory role for presidential appointments, except those of
ambassadors.17 Although this view was ultimately rejected, it
underscores the concern that many Framers had with allowing the vice
president to be involved in nominating people to executive and judicial
positions and also possibly voting on their nominations.18
B.

The Senate Goes Nuclear

Senate Republicans first toyed with the idea of shutting off debate
on judicial nominees with only fifty-one votes when Senate Democrats
announced plans to filibuster the nominations of Charles W. Pickering,
Jr. and Miguel Estrada for federal appellate judgeships.19 In the end,
seven Senators from each party, dubbed the Gang of 14, struck a deal to
end the Democratic filibusters in exchange for Republicans not invoking
the nuclear option.
On November 21, 2013, in response to three blocked nominations
for the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, Senate Democrats changed the
rules of the Senate and deployed the nuclear option20 so that judicial
nominees, cabinet secretaries, and other presidentially-nominated
positions could advance to confirmation votes with a simple majority vote
for cloture, rather than the sixty-vote supermajority that had been
commonplace since 1975.21 This rule change did not affect nominees to
14
15
16
17
18
19

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jim VandeHei & Charles Babington, From Senator’s 2003 Outburst, GOP Hatched ‘Nuclear
Option,’ WASH. POST (May 19, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2005/05/18/AR2005051802144.html, archived at https://perma.cc/57XM-V9HS.
20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its own
Proceedings . . . .”); see also United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892).
21 Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminate Filibusters on Most
Nominees, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/SenatePoised-to-Limit-Filibusters-in-Party-Line-Vote-That-Would-Alter-Centuries-of-Precedent/2013/
11/21/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html, archived at https://perma.cc/3ZCQRNSB.
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the Supreme Court, but many saw the change as a Pandora’s box.22
Relying on the precedent set by Senate Democrats, Senate
Republicans predictably applied the new rule to the nomination of
Supreme Court Justices in April 2017 for the nomination of now-Justice
Neil Gorsuch.23 But even then, the vice president did not cast a tiebreaking vote because three Senate Democrats joined Senate Republicans
to confirm Justice Gorsuch with fifty-four votes.24 However, the nuclear
fallout produced the grotesque democratic disfigurement—far from
historic practice and what the Framers imagined—that we see today,
where the vice president is able to vote to confirm cabinet nominees and
ambassadors, and could theoretically cast the tie-breaking vote for lower
court and Supreme Court nominees.
C.

The Vice President Today

Current Vice President Michael Pence has exercised his Article I
authority in numerous novel ways. As of the publication of this essay,
Vice President Pence has cast tie-breaking votes in the Senate on nine
separate occasions.25 In his first vote, he broke the tie to confirm Betsy
DeVos as the Secretary of Education26 amidst serious questions about her
qualifications and fitness for the position.27 This was the first time a vice
president had ever invoked their Article I authority to confirm a member
of a President’s cabinet.28
22 Amber Phillips, So, Which Party is Responsible for the Death of the Filibuster? Let’s Debate,
WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2017) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/04/04/sowhich-party-is-responsible-for-the-death-of-the-filibuster-lets-debate, archived at https://
perma.cc/Y5AK-3MJB. Then-Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell said in 2013, “Let me
assure you: This Pandora’s box, once opened, will be utilized again and again by future
majorities—and it will make the meaningful consensus-building that has served our nation so well
a relic of the past.” Id.
23 Matt Flegenheimer, Senate Republicans Deploy ‘Nuclear Option’ to Clear Path for Gorsuch,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/politics/neil-gorsuchsupreme-court-senate.html, archived at https://perma.cc/M7ZQ-NTDU.
24 Darla Cameron, Kevin Schaul, Kim Soffen & Kevin Uhrmacher, Vote count: How the Senate
Changed Its Rules and Confirmed Gorsuch, WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2017, 12:12 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/gorsuch-senate-votes, archived at https://perma.cc/
6YWL-NGG3.
25 Tie Votes, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/four_column_table/
Tie_Votes.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/7A96-XXLF.
26 PN37—Elisabeth Prince DeVos—Department of Education, U.S. CONG., https://
www.congress.gov/nomination/115th-congress/37 (last updated Feb. 7, 2018), archived at https://
perma.cc/7BMG-HLE2.
27 DeVos drew criticism for her support of the expansion of charter schools and of school
voucher programs, which direct tax dollars to for-profit schools, parochial schools, and online
schools. She was also criticized for suggesting that guns were necessary in some schools to protect
children against grizzly bears. See Dana Goldstein, Betsy DeVos, Pick for Secretary of Education,
Is the Most Jeered, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/us/politics/
betsy-devos-nominee-education-secretary.html, archived at https://perma.cc/3K6E-P8B9.
28 See supra note 25, at n. 3. The closest historical analog to this novel exercise of authority
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Vice President Pence also cast tie-breaking votes to confirm one of
President Trump’s nominees for an ambassadorship,29 as well as a
nominee for a position in the Office of Management and Budget.30 Not
since Vice President Alben W. Barkley, from 1949 until 1952, has a vice
president cast so many tie-breaking votes in the Senate in such a relatively
short period of time,31 and Barkley did so for much less consequential
matters.
The resurgence of the vice-presidential vote is likely an outgrowth
of partisanship in the Senate, but this resurgence raises a host of concerns
that merit evaluation. The possibility of vice presidents wielding this
power more frequently in connection with the Senate’s executive
business requires an evaluation of the proper exercise of this
constitutional power.
D.

The Three Roles of the Senate

In Federalist No. 68, Alexander Hamilton briefly touched upon the
issue of the vice president’s power to vote in the Senate. One justification
Hamilton gives for the power is that, “to secure at all times the possibility
of a definite resolution of the body, it is necessary that the [vice president]
should have only a casting vote.”32
The Constitution entrusts two distinct responsibilities to the Senate,
namely legislative and executive business.33 The Senate’s legislative
business involves passing resolutions, and its executive business includes
votes on presidential nominees and treaties. By discussing resolution of
the body, and not executive business, Federalist No. 68 can logically be
read to suggest that the vice-presidential power to cast tie-breaking votes
was intended to extend only to the Senate’s legislative duties and not its
was the 1862 tie-breaking vote by Vice President Hamlin to delay the vote on a nomination. See
Learned, supra note 3.
29 U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 115th Congress—2nd Session: On the Nomination
(Confirmation Samuel Dale Brownback, of Kansas, to be Ambassador at Large for International
Religious Freedom), U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_
call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=115&session=2&vote=00023 (last visited Sept. 24, 2018), archived
at https://perma.cc/72X4-UVL5.
30 U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 115th Congress—2nd Session: On the Nomination
(Confirmation Russell Vought, of Virginia, to be Deputy Director of the Office of Management and
Budget), U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_
cfm.cfm?congress=115&session=2&vote=00040 (last visited Sept. 24, 2018), archived at https://
perma.cc/2CQC-6J9Q.
31 See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. Pence’s nine votes have actually come in a
shorter period of time than Barkley’s eight votes.
32 THE FEDERALIST No. 68 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin Books 1987)
(emphasis added).
33 RICHARD
S. BETH, BILLS, RESOLUTIONS, NOMINATIONS, AND TREATIES:
CHARACTERISTICS, REQUIREMENTS, AND USES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (Nov. 26, 2008), https://
www.everycrsreport.com/files/20081126_98-728_56b0db894884fa6ee61086da028aca73ea67
7091.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/GLX4-3LBV.
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executive duties, and thus not to confirmations of presidential
nominees.34 This is consistent with the Framer’s fears that, through the
vice president, the Executive branch could cast the deciding vote on its
own nominees. Further, the separation-of-powers concern with the vice
president casting tie-breaking votes in executive matters is intensified
when it comes to judicial nominations because the independence of the
judiciary is involved.
Historically, when the Senate was equally divided on a judicial
nomination, the vice president did not cast a deciding vote, and the
nominee was rejected. On May 22, 1832, the vice president was presiding
in the Senate.35 In executive proceedings that same day, the Senate
considered the nomination of James G. Bryce as judge of the United
States for West Florida, and although the forty-four Senators present were
equally divided on the question, Vice President Calhoun did not cast a
decisive vote for the President’s nominee.36 Perhaps Vice President
Calhoun wanted the nomination to fail, as he did the Van Buren
nomination,37 yet this is apparently the only instance where the Senate
was equally divided on a judicial nomination. Notably, the matter was
resolved without the vice president voting, against the grant of judicial
power, because the nominee did not have enough votes to be confirmed.
The Constitution also entrusts to both the Senate and the House the
responsibility to determine the rules of their proceedings.38 This is neither
legislative nor executive business, but that which does not “relate to
measures of legislation by Congress or to reciprocal or common business
of the two Houses, or . . . to any particular proceeding of the
Senate . . . .”39 In this non-substantive Senate business, Senator Bacon
proposed that the vice president, “not being a member of this body, has
not the right to vote . . . .”40
These three different roles demonstrate that in each capacity, the
Senate is effectively doing something different, and these differences
govern whether or not the vice president should be permitted to exercise
the tie-breaking authority. The only generality one may draw is that vice
34 The definition of the word “resolution” as found in dictionaries from the late 1700s tend not
to support the claim that the word was exclusively used in connection with legislative business. See
JOHN ASH, THE NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1775), available
at https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=nyp.33433081968483;view=1up;seq=15, archived at
https://perma.cc/LVM7-BDE9. However, in Thomas Jefferson’s A Manuel of Parliamentary
Practice For the Use of the Senate of the United States (1801), the word “resolution” is used
exclusively in reference to legislative proceedings. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUEL OF
PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 36 (1801).
35 S. JOURNAL, 22nd Cong., 1st Sess. 293 (1823).
36 S. EXECUTIVE JOURNAL, 22nd Cong., 1st Sess. 249 (1823).
37 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
38 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a
Member.”).
39 See Learned, supra note 3, at 575 (quoting Senator Augustus Octavius Bacon of Georgia).
40 Id.
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presidential participation is always proper in legislative and procedural
matters. In executive business, and business that is neither executive,
legislative, nor procedural, there is no consensus on the propriety of the
vice president casting a tie-breaking vote.
II.

LEGISLATIVE VOTES AND CONFIRMATION VOTES

The legislative and executive functions of the Senate differ in many
important ways. The most relevant distinction is the permanence and
irreversible nature of presidential nominations, especially with respect to
Article III judges.41 While the independence of the federal judiciary is a
key concern, the other distinctions are worth highlighting.
A.

Legislation in the Senate

In its legislative function, the Senate may vote to pass a bill that is
small and relatively inconsequential, or massively significant and
contentious. When the Senate is evenly divided on a legislative vote, the
vice president may properly break the tie to ensure a definite resolution.42
In such cases, assuming the president signs the bill into law, it will
become the law of the United States. However, such a law can be changed
by many means. Laws can be amended, sometimes radically changing
how they function.43 Laws, and even constitutional amendments, can also
be completely repealed.44 Finally, the Supreme Court can declare a law
or part of a law unconstitutional, as the Court has done on many
occasions.45
The legislative process is final, until it is not. Myriad constitutional
mechanisms exist for laws to be changed, and while many laws are
permanent and sacrosanct for all intents and purposes, the fact is that
those laws could very well cease to exist. Our democratic system ensures
that our government is responsive to the will of the people. It would be
quite a juxtaposition to have certain laws that could not be amended or

41 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”).
42 See THE FEDERALIST No. 68, supra note 32.
43 For example, in December 2017, Congress repealed the individual mandate provision of the
2009 Affordable Care Act. See Robert Pear, Individual Mandate Now Gone, G.O.P Targets the
One for Employers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/14/us/politics/
employer-mandate.html, archived at https://perma.cc/8DXA-GLZK.
44 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (repealing U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII).
45 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding a portion of the Brady
Act, which imposes affirmative duties upon states, unconstitutional); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992) (holding the take-title provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy unconstitutional).
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repealed through the democratic process.
This all demonstrates how legislative enactments, even those that
have become functionally permanent, lack the permanence of other
Senate actions. If the vice president takes part in a legislative or
procedural vote, that is circumstantial evidence that, at the very least, the
vote is somewhat controversial. The controversial nature indicates that at
some time in the future, in one way or another, there is a distinct
possibility that the legislation the vice president voted on will change in
character or be repealed when the political winds shift.46 Thus, when a
vice president casts the tie-breaking vote on a legislative matter, the effect
of that vote is less permanent than when the vice president casts a tiebreaking vote to confirm presidential nominations.
B.

Non-Judicial Confirmation Votes

There is nothing, at least in this day and age, less controversial about
important pieces of legislation than there is about presidential
nominations. But there is an important distinction: the Senate cannot alter
a presidential nomination after it has fulfilled its constitutional advise and
consent role. With respect to appointments to the Executive Branch, the
Senate cannot (and should not be able to) remove executive officers after
confirming them.47 Only the president can do so.48
Perhaps for this reason, and the Framers’ concern about the vice
president casting the decisive vote on an executive nomination, there are
only three historic examples of the vice president casting such votes. In
1925, Vice President Charles G. Dawes almost cast the tie-breaking vote
to confirm President Calvin Coolidge’s nominee for attorney general.
There was no objection to the idea that he may be needed to participate
in the vote, but as fate would have it, Dawes was napping at the nearby
Willard Hotel, and in the time it took for Dawes to make his way to the
Capitol, one Democratic senator switched his vote and the nomination
was rejected.49 As noted, Vice President Calhoun also defeated the
nomination of Van Buren to be the Minister to Great Britain. And finally,
46
47

See supra note 43.
While one may conjure up a hypothetical in which a majority in the Senate “goes rogue” and
begins impeaching justices of the Supreme Court, that possibility is too far-flung to merit serious
discussion in this article.
48 See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 632 (1935) (“[T]he power of the
President alone to make the removal is confined to purely executive officers . . . .”). See also
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (recognizing that Congress cannot reserve for itself the
power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment)
(citing Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986)).
49 MARK O. HATFIELD, WITH THE SENATE HISTORICAL OFFICE, VICE PRESIDENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1789–1993 359–68 (Wash.: U.S. Gov’t Printing Off. 1997), https://
www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/charles_dawes.pdf, archived at https://
perma.cc/9DCP-L547.
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Vice President George Clinton voted to confirm John Armstrong as the
Minister to Spain in 1806.50
This scant, largely distant history of the vice president casting tiebreaking votes on presidential nominees for executive offices indicates
that vice presidents may have perceived a prudential limit on their power
to cast such votes, but it is by no means conclusive.
C.

Judicial Confirmations in the Senate

The concerns over vice presidents casting votes on nominations to
the executive branch are magnified with respect to votes on nominations
to the judicial branch. Unlike ambassadors, cabinet secretaries, agency
heads, and other high-level executive nominees, Article III judges
exercise purely judicial power, and cannot be removed by the president.51
They can be impeached, but impeachment is justified only in rare
circumstances.52
Most of the executive positions that require presidential
nominations53 last only until the next lost election, so the political process
still provides a check on these appointments. While these appointments
may be permanent for the entirety of a presidential administration,54 they
do not enjoy the job security of Article III judges.
In contrast, the independence of judges is the cornerstone of our
judicial system. In Federalist No. 78, Hamilton wrote extensively on the
importance of, and justification for, having judges who could not be
removed from office except in instances of, presumably, bad behavior.
Independent judges, Hamilton wrote, are “[an] excellent barrier to the
encroachments and oppressions of the representative body. And it is the
best expedient which can be devised in any government, to secure a
steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.”55
When designing a judicial system, it must be placed somewhere on
a spectrum between complete independence and strict accountability.56
Too far to the accountability side, and the judges will look like
representatives imbued with judicial authority. Too far to the
independence side and judges can make decisions wildly out of touch
with society’s beliefs. The Framers of the Constitution erred on the side
50
51
52
53

S. EXECUTIVE JOURNAL, 9th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1806).
See supra note 48.
See infra note 60.
Occasionally, presidents do decide to keep officials who were appointed by their
predecessor. See, e.g., Obama Keeps Several Bush Picks in Top Jobs, C.B.S. NEWS (Aug. 31, 2009)
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-keeps-several-bush-picks-in-top-jobs, archived at https://
perma.cc/5ZEY-T2RQ.
54 As long as the president does not fire them.
55 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin Books 1987).
56 See generally Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and the Role
of Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78 IND. L. J. 153 (2003).
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of independence and qualified judicial tenure only on “Good
Behaviour.”57 This ensures that only the most egregious violations of
judicial power and abuses of office are punished by removal.58
Impeachment has historically been limited to ethical violations and
criminal conduct.59 Those exercises of judicial power that are
questionable and disfavored are permitted to stand because the
institutional interests in independence outweigh many individual
imprudent acts of judges.60 To impeach and remove an Article III judge
on scant evidence of bad behavior would be a serious violation of the
separation of powers.
For good reason, neither the people nor the president can remove
Article III judges from office. The Framers gave the Senate an advice and
consent role in the nomination of Article III judges, and the Seventeenth
Amendment61 enabled the people, rather than the state legislators, to elect
their Senators. It follows that the advice and consent role gives the people,
through their elected Senators, a voice in the nomination of federal judges
and other presidential nominees.
If the Vice President were to cast the tie-breaking vote to confirm a
Supreme Court Justice, or even a controversial district court judge, that
decision would—barring unforeseeable circumstances—be final.
Statistically, that judge would likely serve until their death.62 Since all
Article III judges now need only a simple majority to be confirmed,63 the
need for the vice president’s vote would signify that less than a majority
of the country, speaking through its Senators, wish to confer upon the
nominated individual the functionally uncheckable power of the federal
judiciary.64
Unlike legislation, the act of confirming a judicial nominee in the
Senate cannot and indeed should not be altered.65 This permanence
requires that nominees for federal judgeships must gain, at the very least,
57
58

See supra note 41.
Since 1803, only fifteen federal judges have been impeached by the House of
Representatives, and only eight were removed in the Senate. See Impeachments of Federal Judges,
FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/impeachments-federal-judges (last visited
Sept. 9, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/2U8R-STCL. By an overwhelming percentage, death
is the primary reason that seats on the federal bench become vacant. See Demography of Article III
Judges, 1789–2017, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/ageand-experience-judges (last visited Sept. 9, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/LP4Z-AM7C.
59 See Douglas Keith, Impeachment and Removal of Judges: An Explainer, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUSTICE (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/impeachment-and-removaljudges-explainer, archived at https://perma.cc/7X7C-AVTH.
60 In his 1992 book-length study of two precedent-setting impeachment cases, the late Chief
Justice William Rehnquist found that the early uses of impeachment power established the norm
that judicial acts would not be a basis for impeachment. Id.
61 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
62 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
63 See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
64 However, this could also be true if fifty-one Senate votes came from Senators representing
the smallest states.
65 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
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the support of a majority of Senators, to give effect to the purpose of the
Seventeenth Amendment.66 Ideally, federal judges should need a twothirds majority to be confirmed in the Senate, but reality dictates a lower
threshold. If the vice president were to be the deciding vote for the
confirmation of an Article III judge, that judge would lack the legitimacy
that the judicial system requires as an institution. The questions of
legitimacy increases in importance for federal appellate judges,
especially the justices of the Supreme Court.67
When the Senate fulfills its advice and consent role, and the result
for all functional purposes is permanent, irrevocable, and of great
consequence for the entire country, the vice president should not exercise
the Article I authority to break a tie vote. Allowing the vice president to
break a tie serves the interest of a definite resolution,68 but if the Senate
deadlocks, that judicial nomination would fail and that would also be a
definite resolution without the need for the vice president to vote. Based
on prudential concerns, evidence that vice-presidential participation in
specific, non-resolution matters was not envisioned by the Framers of the
Constitution, and in the interest of maintaining the legitimacy of the
judicial system, doubts about a judicial nominee should be resolved
against the conferral of uncheckable judicial authority.
III.
A.

INTER-BRANCH CONFLICTS
The President’s Agent

Under the electoral system created by the Framers, the vice
presidency was to be filled by the individual who received the second
most votes in the Electoral College.69 Under that system, rather than act
as an agent of the president, the vice president acted as the President’s
direct opposition, creating a microcosm of the country’s political
divisions in the White House, for better or worse.
The election of 1800 revealed problems with such a system when
both Aaron Burr and Thomas Jefferson received the same number of
66 This is not to say that all close votes for judicial nominees present legitimacy issues. For
example, although Justice Clarence Thomas was confirmed with only fifty-two votes, he had the
support of a majority of the Senators. While a two-thirds supermajority would better insulate the
judiciary from partisan attacks, there is no principled reason to attack the legitimacy of a particular
judge or Justice because of a close vote unless the vice president breaks the tie.
67 The vast majority of cases end at the Courts of Appeals. For example, of the roughly 8,000
cases in which petitions for certiorari were filed in 2017, the Supreme Court decided only seventytwo cases. The cases the Supreme Court does take up are often the difficult issues that have divided
the federal courts, and those cases that resolve certain issues of national importance. See, e.g., Adam
Feldman, Cert Analytics, EMPIRICAL SCOTUS (Jan. 10, 2017), https://empiricalscotus.com/2017/
01/10/cert-analytics, archived at https://perma.cc/H6TG-8S9Y.
68 See THE FEDERALIST No. 68, supra note 32.
69 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
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votes.70 Four years later, Congress adopted the Twelfth Amendment,71
which created the system we have today where the president and vice
president run on the same ticket.
Over 150 years later, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment formally
provided that the vice president would assume the presidency if the
president was unable to discharge the duties of the office.72 However,
neither the Twelfth nor the Twenty-Fifth Amendments changed the text
of the Constitution regarding the vice president’s role as President of the
Senate or his tie-breaking authority. Although the vice presidency
evolved through both Amendments, there is no formal indication that
either Amendment altered the vice president’s constitutional powers.
Historically, the vice presidency has been mocked for its lack of
importance. It has been referred to as “simply standby equipment,” 73 it
has been passed up on more than one occasion,74 and vice presidents have
taken on executive tasks that “were not deemed worthy of the president’s
calendar”75 but still required an executive presence.
But this attitude toward the vice presidency has largely changed in
the modern era. Vice presidents today represent the interests of the
president for whom they serve by giving speeches, campaigning,
attending ceremonies, and visiting foreign countries.76 Their
relationships, know-how, and experiences are at the president’s disposal,
and oftentimes vice presidents are chosen to address a presidential
candidate’s specific electoral weaknesses.77 For all practical matters, the
contemporary vice presidency is an extension of the presidency, and the
modern vice president acts primarily as an agent of the president.

70 John Ferling, Thomas Jefferson, Aaron Burr and the Election of 1800, SMITHSONIAN MAG.
(Nov. 1, 2004), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/thomas-jefferson-aaron-burr-and-theelection-of-1800-131082359, archived at https://perma.cc/C5NV-STJY.
71 U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
72 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
73 Joel K. Goldstein, The Rising Power of the Modern Vice Presidency, 38 PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. 374, 374 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
74 See id. (quoting Daniel Webster’s and John Nance Garner’s respective denigrations of the
office).
75 Id. at 376. See also George C. Edwards III & Lawrence R. Jacobs, The New Vice Presidency:
Institutions and Politics, 38 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 369, 370 (2008) (“For nearly 200 years, the
vice president languished in obscurity, derision, and irrelevance.”).
76 See generally Edwards & Jacobs, supra note 75.
77 Id. at 379; see also Nora Kelly, Choosing the Veep of Your Dreams, ATLANTIC (Apr. 23,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/vice-president-clinton-trump/
479553, archived at https://perma.cc/X58A-NN3X (“How can they—their background, their
reputation—help or hinder a campaign? Joe Biden in 2008 helped alleviate worries about President
Obama’s foreign policy credentials . . . Bill Clinton’s decision to choose Al Gore was a
‘generational message.’ Even John McCain’s oft-criticized selection of Sarah Palin painted a
potentially helpful picture: She had a reputation in Alaska for being a reformer . . . .”).
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The Separation of Powers Problem

The office of the vice presidency is provided for in Article II of the
Constitution,78 which makes the office part of the Executive Branch.
Indeed, he or she is but a heartbeat away from the Presidency itself.79
There has, however, been some debate over whether the vice presidency
is indeed a position in the Executive Branch, or whether the role is
primarily legislative since the only constitutional power granted to the
vice president is found in Article I.80
When vice presidents cast a tie-breaking vote on a legislative or
procedural matter in the Senate, the operative effect is that the Executive
Branch resolves an issue that arose in the Senate. Vice presidents do not
participate in the debate, or the study of the issue at hand, they merely
weigh the issue on its face and casts the deciding vote. This ensures for
the “definite resolution of the body” that Hamilton imagined in Federalist
No. 68.81
In the case of presidential nominations, the vice president, as an
executive branch official, may play a role in the choice of who to
nominate to fill vacancies in the federal judiciary. This is also true for the
nomination of cabinet members and other political appointees.82
This dual role that the vice president may play distorts the separation
of powers between the branches of government. If, for example, the
president outsourced the selection of a judicial nominee to the vice
president, then the vice president broke a tie to confirm that nominee, it
would be a mockery of the advice and consent process. Yet there are no
procedural mechanisms to stop this from happening, only prudential
limitations.
Some executive business is so important, and of such great
consequence, that the Framers created a check on the executive power by
78
79
80

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
WILLIAM SAFIRE, SAFIRE’S POLITICAL DICTIONARY 311 (2008).
In 2007, Vice President Richard Cheney contended that his office is not obligated to submit
to oversight, unlike other members and parts of the Executive Branch are, because his office is not
an entity within the Executive Branch. See PETER BAKER, White House Defends Cheney’s Refusal
of Oversight, WASH. POST (June 23, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2007/06/22/AR2007062201809.html, archived at https://perma.cc/7ZHY-GMD6. This
argument was ridiculed by administration critics because, for the proceeding seven years, the White
House had acknowledged the Executive Branch status of the vice president. See Satyam Khanna,
Overwhelming Proof that Cheney Is in the Executive Branch, THINK PROGRESS (June 29, 2007),
https://thinkprogress.org/overwhelming-proof-that-cheney-is-in-the-executive-branch57aa6f177ca9, archived at https://perma.cc/LXU7-7V7H.
81 See supra note 32.
82 Vice President Pence handled the transition effort for the Trump Administration after Chris
Christie was pushed aside. See Michael D. Shear, Maggie Haberman & Michael S. Schmidt, Vice
President-Elect Pence to Take Over Trump Transition Effort, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/11/12/us/politics/trump-cabinet.html, available at https://perma.cc/55P3XAZ4. “The reorganization puts the urgent task of selecting cabinet officials and key West Wing
posts in the hands of Mr. Pence . . . .” Id.
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giving the Senate an advisory role in the nomination of some positions.83
If a nomination is unable to garner the support of a majority of Senators,
that is a signal that the Senate does not consent to the nominee. The vice
president should not tip the scales in such an event and circumvent the
important check the Framers placed on executive power.
CONCLUSION
Allowing the vice president to cast a tie-breaking vote in order to
confirm a judicial nominee would not run afoul of the Constitution per se
but would violate underlying values. It would infringe on the separation
of powers, the notion of advice and consent, and the idea of majority rule.
For judicial nominations, where the president must seek the advice and
consent of the Senate, there is reason to believe that the vice president’s
Article I authority ought not be invoked when a majority of the Senate
does not consent to the nominee.
We should not embrace with open arms all that our Constitution
does not explicitly prohibit as it pertains to governmental authority. To
respect the Constitution is not to just respect its letter, but to respect the
values that it embodies. Our Constitution does not prohibit journalists
from being investigated by the government, but the values of the First
Amendment clearly counsel against such action. Nor does our
Constitution explicitly prohibit the President using the Department of
Justice to target political opponents for prosecution under the guise of law
enforcement, but our understanding of our system of government strongly
mitigates against such action.
The vice president’s Article I authority to break ties in the Senate
should be limited to the Senate’s legislative business and should not
extend to the Senate’s executive business as it concerns federal judicial
nominees, and especially nominees to the Supreme Court. The crown
jewel of our constitutional system—our independent judiciary—requires
utmost legitimacy. To allow a nominee to ascend to the federal bench in
the face of such opposition in the Senate would rob our judiciary of that
requisite legitimacy.

83 See, e.g., Russell L. Weaver, “Advice and Consent” in Historical Perspective, 64 DUKE L.
J. 1717, 1721–22 (2015).

